Other important points raised by competition authorities and courts in the context of the exchange of information are the following: an agreement restricting production, sale or production is just as illegal as direct pricing, because reducing the supply of a product or service drives up its price. For example, the FTC challenged an agreement between competing oil importers to restrict the supply of lubricants by refusing to import or sell those products in Puerto Rico. Competitors have tried to pressure lawmakers to levy an environmental filing tax for lubricants, warning of lubricant shortages and higher prices. The FTC argued that the conspiracy was an illegal horizontal agreement to restrict production, which was inherently likely to affect competition and had no countervailing efficiencies that would benefit consumers. Restrictions of competition by object are those which, by their very nature, are liable to restrict competition. These are restrictions which, having regard to the objectives pursued by the Community competition rules, have such a high potential for adverse effects on competition that it is not necessary, for the purposes of the application of Article 81(1), to demonstrate actual effects on the market. That presumption is based on the gravity of the restriction and on experience showing that restrictions of competition by object are liable to have a negative impact on the market and to jeopardise the objectives pursued by the Community competition rules. Targeted restrictions such as price-fixing and market sharing reduce production and increase prices, resulting in misallocation of resources because the goods and services demanded by customers are not produced. They also lead to a reduction in consumer welfare because consumers have to pay higher prices for the goods and services concerned. The Guidelines show that, in most cases, competition concerns are unlikely to arise if the parties have a combined market share not exceeding 15 % in both the purchase market(s) and the sales market(s). Of course, this presupposes that the agreements do not include hardcore restrictions. In this context, an agreement between the parties to the joint purchase agreement on the purchase prices to be paid under the agreement is not considered to be a hardcore restriction. In Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v.

Bunbury Port Authority [2000] FCA 38; (2000) ATPR 41-752, the French judge said this to find out whether competition is significantly reduced. The identification of a market and the definition of its dimensions is „a process of focus“ that requires the selection of „what appears to be the clearest picture of the relevant competitive process in the light of the commercial reality and the objectives of the law“. Bank A`s competitors do not provide information on prices in return. However, they each distribute Bank A`s price information internally. Bank A`s competitors know that there will be less competitive pressure on the prices of their credit products. They are not trying to sublist Bank A, but to shift their interest rates largely according to those of Bank A. Bank A takes note of the reaction of its competitors, and this practice continues over time. Competition Bureau Reaches Agreement with Paper Excellence to Maintain Competition in British Columbia`s Pulp and Paper Industry* The Competition Bureau announced today that it has entered into an agreement to address competition concerns related to the merger of two of Canada`s largest pulp and paper companies . The assessment of whether or not an agreement has as its object the restriction of competition is based on a number of factors.

These factors include, in particular, the content of the agreement and the objectives it pursues. It may also be necessary to take into account the context in which it is (to be) applied and the actual market behaviour of the parties. In other words, an examination of the facts underlying the agreement and the particular circumstances in which it operates may be necessary before it can be determined whether a particular restriction constitutes a restriction of competition by object. The manner in which an agreement is actually implemented may indicate a restriction by object, even if the formal agreement does not contain an express provision to that effect. Evidence of a subjective intention on the part of the parties to restrict competition is a relevant factor, but not a necessary condition. Competition is a fascinating and disturbing concept that is sometimes equated with a healthy imitation and sometimes with a form of Darwinism. Economic analysis provides a useful and rigorous guide to overcoming these oversimplified views by showing that competition is first and foremost a mechanism for eliminating (…) To determine if behavior in a market is having an impact, you need to determine what the market is. A widely accepted judicial definition is that „horizontal cooperation“ means agreements or arrangements between companies operating at the same level of the supply chain, i.e. actual (or potential) competitors. B), for example a joint R&D project between competing technology companies or a sales and marketing joint venture between competitors. In contrast, „vertical“ agreements are agreements between companies operating at different levels of the supply chain, e.B.

a supply contract from a supplier of raw materials to a manufacturer or a distribution agreement between a manufacturer and a retailer.4 The Commission generally refers to these agreements as „marketing agreements“. This applies to joint selling, where the parties agree on all commercial aspects related to the sale of the product, including the price. However, it also includes more limited forms of cooperation, such as.B. distribution agreements (e.g. B where a party engages its competitor to distribute its products in a specific territory), customer service, advertising or logistics. . There must be a likely purpose, effect or effect of the challenged conduct on competition that is significant in terms of importance or relevance to the competitive process. The fact that an agreement restricts competition does not mean that it is automatically prohibited unless it is a hardcore cartel. An agreement falling within the scope of the prohibitions laid down in Chapter I or Article 101 may be excluded or exempted from the competition rules. Non-exhaustive information on the proposed restrictions can be found in the Commission`s regulations, guidelines and communications on block exemptions.

Restrictions on the block exemption blacklist or identified as hardcore restrictions in the Guidelines and Notices are generally considered by the Commission to be restrictions by object. In the case of horizontal agreements, restrictions of competition by object include price fixing, limiting production and sharing markets and customers. In the case of vertical agreements, the category of restrictions by object includes, in particular, the fixing of fixed and minimum prices for resale and restrictions ensuring absolute territorial protection, including restrictions on passive sales. If the ACCC does not reach the level of understanding, it considers that the conduct of Bank A and its competitors is likely to constitute a concerted practice. In addition to mergers, strategic alliances and similar transactions, there are many ways for competitors to work together under competition law. Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), with its equivalents under the national law of the EU Member States, is the most important provision of EU competition law in this context. On the whole, it prohibits agreements which, by reason or effect, restrict, distort or prevent competition (Article 101(1) TFEU). However, agreements which have been shown to provide consumer-friendly benefits that outweigh the anti-competitive effects may be exempted provided that the relevant exemption conditions are met (Article 101(3) TFEU).

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