As mentioned above, the theory of social contracts has an empirical dimension and a normative dimension. The empirical dimension, called the „origins“ question, provides a historical account of the origins of the state. The normative dimension of the theory of the social contract is a representation of the principles of justice that legitimize the state. In the normative dimension of social contract theory, it is useful to distinguish two more specific questions generally addressed in social contract theory: (1) What are the principles of justice that bind citizens in their relations with each other?; and (2) Under what conditions can the state legitimately act as the supreme arbiter in relations between citizens? The theory of the social contract that answers these two questions is based on consent, which applies first to the principles of justice that govern society, and then to the establishment of a sovereign or state with legitimate coercive powers. The rest of this article deals with the former as the question of „justice“ and the latter as the question of „legitimacy“. In addition to subjectivism, Hobbes also concludes from his mechanistic theory of human nature that man is necessarily and exclusively selfish. All people pursue only what they perceive in their own individual interest – they react mechanically by being attracted to what they desire and being repulsed by the one they are opposed to. It is a universal claim: it should cover all human actions in all circumstances – in society or outside, in relation to strangers and friends, in relation to small ends and the most generalized human desires, such as the desire for power and status. Everything we do is motivated solely by the desire to improve our own situation and satisfy our own individual desires as much as possible.

We are infinitely appetizing and only really concerned about ourselves. According to Hobbes, even the reason adults care for young children can be explained in terms of adults` self-interest (he claims that when we save a child by taking care of him, we become the recipient of a strong sense of duty in someone who has been helped to survive rather than being allowed to die). 32. Animals that are unable to conclude binding agreements between themselves in order not to cause or suffer harm are neither without justice nor without injustice; and also for peoples who could not or would not conclude binding agreements so as not to cause or suffer harm. How the contract theorist models the parties to the agreement is determined by our (real) problem of justification and what is relevant to its solution. A big gap between contemporary theories of the social contract is therefore to define the problem of justification. A distinction is often made between Hobbesian („contractary“) and Kantian („contractualist“) interpretations of the problem of justification. These categories are inaccurate, and there are often as many differences between these two approaches as there are between them, but the distinction is nonetheless useful in isolating some key issues from contemporary social contract theory. Among these „entrepreneurs“ who can be described – very crudely – as hobbes` disciples, the crucial task of justification is, as Gauthier (1991, 16) puts it, to resolve the „fundamental crisis“ of morality: what is the social contract? An agreement between the citizen and the government? No, it would only mean the continuation of [Rousseau`s] idea. The social contract is an agreement between man and man; an agreement from which what we call society must result. It mentions the concept of commutative justice, first put forward by the primitive fact of exchange.

is replaced by distributive justice. If you translate these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is, in its highest sense, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers and renounce any claim to govern each other. Because of his rather strict view of humanity, Hobbes nevertheless succeeds in creating an argument that makes civil society possible with all its advantages. In the context of political events in his England, he also managed to argue for the maintenance of the traditional form of authority that his society had long enjoyed, while placing it on what he saw as a much more acceptable basis. Rousseau wrote his second speech in response to an essay competition sponsored by the Dijon Academy. (Rousseau had already won the same essay competition with an earlier essay commonly referred to as the first speech.) He describes the historical process by which man began in a state of nature and over time has „progressed“ in civil society. According to Rousseau, the state of nature was a peaceful and chimerical period. People lived a lonely and simple life. Their few needs were easily met by nature.

Due to the abundance of nature and the small size of the population, there was no competition and people rarely saw each other, let alone had reasons for conflict or fear. Moreover, these simple and morally pure people were inherently endowed with the capacity for compassion and therefore reluctant to harm each other. Moehler`s „multi-level“ contract (2017) has several aspects. First, individuals, because of their pluralistic moral obligations, seek to agree on socio-moral rules that everyone can defend as a common morality. This purpose of this agreement is similar to that of the Darwall, Gaus and Southwood models. The second-level agreement is appropriate for circumstances where pluralism is so deep and broad that no common morality can be forged. Instead of moral agents, the parties are being rethought as instrumentally rational supervisory agents: the purpose of this second level is rules of cooperation that promote the interests of all when a deeper moral foundation cannot be discovered. Given that the end of the „unification of men in common“ (para.

124) is the preservation of their wealth and the preservation of their life, liberty and well-being in general, Locke can easily imagine the conditions under which the pact with the government is destroyed and men have the right to oppose the authority of a civil government such as a king. When the executive power of a government turns into tyranny, for example by the dissolution of the legislature and thus by the denial of the people`s ability to legislate for its own preservation, then the resulting tyrant enters into a state of nature and, in particular, a state of war with the people, and they then have the same right to self-defence as before the conclusion of a pact for the establishment of society in general. In other words, the justification for the authority of the executive component of government is the protection of the property and well-being of the people, so that if this protection no longer exists, or if the king becomes a tyrant and acts against the interests of the people, they have the right, if not a complete obligation, to oppose their authority. The social pact can be dissolved and the process of creating a political society can be revived. After the introduction of private property, the initial conditions of inequality became more pronounced. Some have property and others are forced to work for them, and the development of social classes begins. Finally, those who have property note that it would be in their interest to create a government that protects private property from those who do not have it but can see that they can acquire it by force. Thus, the government is established by a treaty that claims to guarantee equality and protection for all, even if its real purpose is to petrify the very inequalities that private property has produced. In other words, the treaty that claims to be equal in the interest of all is really in the interest of a few who have become stronger and richer through the development of private property. It is the naturalized social contract that Rousseau blames for the conflict and competition that modern society suffers.

As is well known, Ronald Dworkin objected that a hypothetical (double) agreement cannot bind a real person. For the hypothetical analysis to be meaningful, it must be shown that hypothetical persons in the contract can agree to be bound by a principle that governs social regulations. Suppose it can be demonstrated that your surrogate mother (a more informed and impartial version of you) would accept a principle. What does this have to do with you? When this hypothetical analysis of the second step is applied, it seems that it is suggested that you might be bound by agreements that others, unlike you, would have entered into. While it may be reasonable (although it doesn`t have to be) to reasonably assume that you might be bound by agreements that you would have entered into yourself if you had had the opportunity to do so, it seems crazy to think that you might be bound by agreements that you clearly would not have entered into, even if you had been asked. However, this criticism is only decisive if the hypothetical social contract is to invoke your normative power of personal commitment over consent. That your surrogate mother uses her power to bond would not mean that you have used your power. But here too, the power to engage is generally not asserted in the contemporary social contract: the problem of reasoning is intended to help us move forward on the problem of justification. So the question for hypothetical contemporary contract theories is whether your surrogate`s hypothetical agreement pursues your reasons for accepting social arrangements, a completely different question. Rousseau`s political theory differs from that of Locke and Hobbes in important respects.

Rousseau`s collectivism is most evident in his development of the „luminous conception“ (which he attributes to Denis Diderot) of the general will […].